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Executive summary
The COVID-19 pandemic poses major challenges for those charged with overseeing 
electoral processes, but the innovative ways in which practitioners are addressing 
these challenges indicate that elections can be safely held even under pandemic 
conditions. These innovations also represent opportunities for strengthening 
electoral practices and making them more resilient to a variety of other risks.  
This briefing draws on existing experience of elections held during the COVID-19 
pandemic and previous health crises to address five areas of vulnerability: 
inclusive and accountable electoral management, poll worker safeguarding, inter-
institutional collaboration, feasible and effective election observation, and the risk 
of electoral violence.
The analyses indicate that there are a large number of things that electoral 
practitioners can do to hold elections safely under pandemic conditions. Most of 
these are techniques that have been employed previously in some form, and we 
caution against the introduction of entirely new and untested approaches at the 
current time. The most useful innovations are those such as widening poll-worker 
recruitment, inter-institutional coordination and hybrid election observation that 
build on existing practice.
The analyses also highlight the importance of not losing track of the need to bolster 
the transparency, accountability and security of electoral practices. Far from 
there being a trade-off between making elections safe in pandemic conditions and 
achieving these other aims, we argue that efforts to maximise electoral integrity and 
to preserve electoral peace will also help to ensure that democratic elections can be 
safeguarded from the risks associated with COVID-19.
Our principal recommendations fall into three categories: those targeted at electoral 
administrators, those aimed at election observation organisations, and general 
recommendations that are relevant to administrators, observers and electoral 
assistance providers. 
Recommendations for electoral 
administrators:
• The public and vulnerable groups should be consulted during election 
preparations.
• Complaints systems should be fully made available to citizens and electoral 
stakeholders to report problems during the process.
• Parliamentary committees should be used to oversee the work of electoral 
management bodies (EMBs).
• EMBs must use their websites and social media presence to provide accurate 
information about the voting process and should monitor social media for 
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misinformation campaigns.
• EMBs should also take strong measures to address disinformation and hate 
speech during election period that could cause harm to electoral stakeholders.
• EMBs must maximise transparency and provide clear records of their meetings 
held to prepare for elections during COVID-19.
• The effective management and safeguarding of poll workers require planning 
well ahead. The fast-evolving pandemic may well necessitate measures tailored 
to local needs, depending on severity of lockdowns and COVID-19 infections.
• Polling stations should be widely distributed so as to reduce the mixing of 
infected and non-infected individuals from different geographic areas; this 
may in some cases require the addition of supplementary polling places and a 
consequent reduction in the number of voters who attend each facility.
• EMBs and national task forces formed to deal with the COVID-19 crisis should 
ensure that each institution’s tasks and responsibilities related to issuing 
guidance, planning, and implementing preventive measures for elections are 
clear and well-delineated.
• Regardless of its level of involvement with a national task force, EMBs should 
strive to obtain advisory, logistical, and operational support from other groups 
while maintaining political neutrality and communicating transparently to 
citizens.
• As it is ultimately their responsibility to hold elections safely, EMBs must 
coordinate with competent public health authorities to inform decisions 
regarding dates of elections and preventive measures to be taken, working to 
build political consensus around these decisions and taking a firm stand against 
actors who push for decisions that can put voters and poll workers at risk to 
advance their political interests.  
Recommendations for electoral observers:
• The travel restrictions and health and safety protocols associated with COVID-19 
threaten to make traditional forms of international election observation 
impossible. International observers should carefully weigh up the strengths and 
weaknesses of the four main strategies open to them.
• The response of international observers will be most effective if they approach 
this as an opportunity to strengthen their work for the long term, rather than 
simply introducing COVID-19 sensitive guidelines and protocols to respond 
to the current health crisis. Many of the changes that are likely to be required 
during the pandemic were already highly advisable.
• International observers should prioritise innovation, look for new ways to 
harness technology and build stronger partnerships between domestic and 
international groups. This will allow the industry both to respond effectively to 
new challenges and to build back better. 
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General recommendations
• Electoral practitioners should, where possible, build on strategies that have 
already been used in the context in question, rather than implementing new 
techniques and technologies from scratch.
• In parts of the world with a history of significant electoral conflict, elections may 
be at increased risk of violence during the pandemic, and practitioners should 
ensure that measures are employed to enhance electoral security in contexts 
where disruption is likely before, during and after polling day.
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Introduction 
The COVID-19 pandemic is a major health crisis that touches on all aspects of 
social, economic and political life. States where elections are scheduled during 
the pandemic face important choices as to when to hold the poll, what measures 
to put in place to reduce the risk of infection associated with electoral processes, 
and how to mitigate the potential impact of election-related tensions that may be 
exacerbated by the circumstances of the pandemic and associated restrictions.
A number of organisations have already made considerable strides in addressing 
procedures for making polling safe during pandemic conditions.1 We do not seek 
to duplicate those efforts; instead we examine some of the aspects of elections that 
have received less attention but are nonetheless vital to the conduct of free, fair and 
credible elections: inclusive and accountable electoral management, poll worker 
safeguarding, inter-institutional collaboration, feasible and effective election 
observation, and reducing the risk of electoral violence.  
Drawing on the experience of electoral events that were held in the first several 
months of the pandemic and also the experience of elections held during previous 
health crises, this briefing offers an overview of how practitioners have approached 
the choices they face and the lessons that can be drawn from their experience.  The 
sections that follow draw on experience in different ways, and they therefore vary 
slightly in format, but they all conclude with recommendations for practitioners 
that will hopefully contribute to making elections held during the pandemic safe 
and democratic.
 
1 The Election Management Network (www.electoralmanagement.com), the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(www.idea-int) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (www.ifes.org) have all published a range of valuable analyses and 
briefings on the challenges of conducting elections under pandemic conditions.
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Part 1: Electoral  
administration 
Managerial transparency, accountability and inclusiveness
Ensuring accountable electoral management is vital to maintaining the credibility 
of elections; the circumstances of the pandemic pose additional challenges that can 
be addressed by further strengthening the inclusiveness and transparency of elec-
toral administration. 
EMBs, as publicly funded bodies that deliver an essential public service, should 
demonstrate that they follow good principles of public management (James 2020a; 
James et al. 2019). This involves not just providing high-quality services to citizens, 
but careful due process, which in turn can bring about better-run elections that 
inspire popular confidence.
Although elections are often held to a high standard, research suggests that EMBs 
tend to have mixed success in achieving these goals during ‘normal’ times.  Realis-
ing transparent, high quality management of the electoral process becomes espe-
cially important during a pandemic, however. There is a risk that public confidence 
in the electoral process could be undermined. For example, if there are discussions 
about postponing an election then a perception might develop that the incumbent 
is trying to use the pandemic to undermine democracy and maximise their chances 
of winning the election (James and Alihodzic 2020). Citizens might also experience 
problems exercising their democratic right to vote if their concerns are not identi-
fied and accommodated.
There are four areas of pressing concern managing elections during the pandemic: 
public participation, accountability mechanisms, public communication and trans-
parency. 
Public participation 
Public participation in electoral administration has both normative and 
instrumental benefits. Involving citizens in the design of public services has a 
normative value because citizens have a right to have their voices heard about 
how services are run. The instrumental value is that it can improve efficiency and 
effectiveness through the identification of problems and can help to identify the 
specific needs of minority and vulnerable groups (James 2020a, 62). These are rarely 
achieved, however, since decision making networks tend to be relatively closed. 
EMB interaction tends to be with the government, the media and political parties, 
while ideas for electoral reform are least likely to come directly from citizens, 
research shows (James 2020a, 157-8). This can create insular bubbles in which the 
needs of other actors are not considered. 
Interactions with civil society could therefore create a much richer ‘needs list’ 
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during the pandemic. Mechanisms for consulting the public or vulnerable groups 
include: holding focus groups, consulting with stakeholder organisations, online 
surveys of samples of the population and open online consultations.   
Accountability mechanisms 
Individual-level mechanisms for redress should be made available in case citizens, 
parties and agents experience problems with the delivery of elections (James 
2020a, 62-3). Complaints systems can be developed so that citizens can register 
their dissatisfaction if they find that their polling station opens late, for example.  
Likewise, party agents should have clear ways in which they report the behaviour 
of electoral officials or inappropriate behaviour by other candidates. These systems 
should be clearly established, if they are not already, because they will improve 
citizen/stakeholder confidence, but also provide important information gathering 
systems for electoral officials about the frequency and nature of problems during 
the electoral process.
Organisational-level accountability mechanisms are also important so that EMBs 
can be held to account for their performance by other organisations.  These 
include (i) upwards to the international community, (ii) horizontally to other state 
institutions such as courts and legislatures to provide checks and balances and (iii) 
downward to domestic non-state actors such as the news media, political parties, 
civil society and the electorate (Norris 2017, 12).
One effective method for EMBs to be held to account at the organisational level is 
through parliamentary committees (James 2020a, 157-8). Parliamentary committees 
can hold enquiries into how an election has been run to identify problems and 
enable immediate lesson-drawing.  For example, the Attorney-General and 
Minister for Justice of Queensland in Australia initiated an inquiry on the running 
of the Queensland 2020 local elections. The elections were held on 28 March, the 
inquiry was initiated on 22 April and it had reported by 2 June (Martínez i Coma 
forthcoming; Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee 2020).  
The use of parliamentary committees will improve accountability, but will also 
raise awareness amongst legislators of the importance of the issue. This could 
avert the late passage of legislation which can be a significant barrier to running 
elections effectively (James 2020b; James and Clark 2020). Committees can also 
call witnesses to update parliament on how plans are proceeding for forthcoming 
elections. In addition, committees which allow evidence submissions from the 
public enable a wider set of stakeholders from civil society groups to academics to 
share their concerns about the delivery of the election.  
   
Public communication  
Electoral authorities are required to communicate clear information about how 
the voting process works. The websites of EMBs are one crucial way in which this 
information can be conveyed.  Previous research shows that this is not always 
provided in full by electoral authorities (Garnett 2017). The provision of full and 
accurate election information is especially important during a pandemic and 
processes might change to extend voting hours, introduce new procedures for 
postal voting or requirements for social distancing. There is also a heightened 
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risk of misinformation being spread by parties and actors who wish to discourage 
participation in areas where support for their opponents is concentrated (Reppell, 
Martin-Rozumiłowicz and Mohan 2020). Checking the accuracy of websites, 
providing public broadcasts via TV and radio and playing a proactive role in 
monitoring and responding to social media are therefore important actions for 
EMBs to undertake in collaboration with social media companies. 
Transparency
Transparency is an important aspect of high-quality public services (Garnett 2017) 
and should be applied to the running of elections during the pandemic. Information 
should therefore be made publicly available via electoral management websites 
about how EMBs are working with other actors during the pandemic, who they have 
consulted with and how the election is likely to be run. This should include the 
publication of meeting minutes, planning documents relating the elections and live 
streams of consultations. The US Electoral Assistance Commission, for example, has 
a designated area of their website devoted to COVID-19 which includes resources for 
electoral officials but also recordings of public hearings.2 No similar information was 
available on the website of the UK Electoral Commission or Cabinet Office websites.3 
This gives the impression of closed-decision making. 
Recommendations:
• The public and vulnerable groups should be consulted during election 
preparations.
• Complaints systems should be fully made available to citizens and electoral 
stakeholders to report problems during the process.
• Parliamentary committees should be used to oversee the work of EMBs.
• EMBs must use their websites and social media presence to provide accurate 
non-partisan information about the voting process and should monitor social 
media for misinformation campaigns.
• EMBs should also take strong measures to address disinformation and hate 
speech during election period that could cause harm to electoral stakeholders.
• EMBs must maximise transparency and provide clear records of their 
meetings held to prepare for elections during COVID-19. 
2 https://www.eac.gov/, date accessed 10th July 2020.
3 As of 10th July 2020.
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Part 2: Polling
COVID-19 and extra demands on poll workers
Running elections is highly labour-intensive. Poll workers in particular, play a vital 
role in building confidence around electoral processes (Hall et al. 2009). Their role 
will be ever more important during forthcoming elections as they will meet and 
interact with voters, issue ballots and oversee polling stations during a challenging 
public health crisis. Many will suggest the pandemic is an opportunity for online 
voting or extended postal voting. Online voting is far from widely accepted or used, 
and while postal voting is much more widespread, most jurisdictions still have a legal 
obligation to provide vote in-person services. Even with voting machines, there is a 
need for poll workers to guide voters on polling day. Here we highlight five key risk 
and threats to how poll workers will cope with the pandemic circumstances and offer 
key recommendations. 
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic imposes a 
severe threat to poll worker recruitment to 
administer the various forthcoming elections 
Recruiting enough workers has always been one of the major challenges of many 
electoral administrators. In some countries, as in the UK, poll workers are civic-
minded volunteers, paid a little for their long day at the polls.  In other countries, 
poll workers are state employees who are seconded to run elections (as in India) 
or selected because of party allegiance or membership. Elsewhere, as in Germany, 
Spain and Mexico, poll workers are citizens who are compelled to undertake the 
task as a civic duty akin to jury service, and not paid much, if at all (Clark and James 
2020).4
Given the low pay, many may not volunteer to work on polling day, or fail to turn up 
to work. They may judge the risk of catching COVID-19 too high. If widespread, this 
could make elections very hard to deliver properly.  Thus, administrators need to 
plan well in advance, and will most likely to need to over recruit, while increasing 
substantially the monetary incentives. 
4 In Mexico, poll workers receive around $20 for their efforts. In the USA, estimates have ranged from $100-$164. In the UK, poll clerks are 
paid around minimum wage for a 16-hour work day (Burden and Milyo, 2015; Cantú and Ley, 2017; Clark and James, 2020).  
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Poll workers face much higher health risks  
of administering elections during the  
ongoing pandemic
There are no widely available international statistics on the typical profile of poll 
workers. However, we know that in the UK’s 2015 general election, poll workers had 
an average age of 53, and 39.3% were over 60, with 30.5% retired from work and the 
oldest being 82 years of age (Clark and James 2017). In the USA in 2018, 58% of poll 
workers were over 60, and 27% over 70.5  These age demographics mean that poll 
workers face higher chances of suffering more severe consequences of COVID-19, an 
issue that administrators should bear in mind when recruiting.
There is therefore a clear need to investigate ways of recruiting younger poll 
workers. One approach might be to emphasise the civic and social incentives behind 
volunteering to work on polling day. Civic incentives revolve around learning more 
about the electoral and political process, and how representatives are elected, while 
social incentives are oriented more towards social capital explanations for why 
people volunteer.  Initial research in the UK suggests both may be important in 
recruiting poll workers (Clark and James 2020).
To mitigate the potential risks, administrators need to offer clear public health 
measures at the polling station and adequate health protection. Countries have 
had a variety of ways of doing so. Poll workers in Wisconsin in April 2020 were 
given surgical masks and latex gloves. Hand sanitiser was made available for voters, 
alcohol wipes used to disinfect surfaces, and signs provided for social distancing. 
Israel had special medically supported polling stations for the symptomatic, with 
full PPE for staff. Singapore and South Korea had temperature screening, face masks 
for polling staff, additional polling stations in Singapore and a requirement for 
voters to wear masks and gloves in South Korea. In the UK, shifts of poll workers 
are being considered in case PPE becomes too cumbersome to wear for a 16-hour 
workday.
A key recommendation would be to establish a minimum standard of measures 
proven to be medically efficient in reducing health risks of contracting COVID-19. 
Promoting and mandating the use of face masks for both voters and poll workers 
would be a good start, ensuring strict social distancing in poll queues, and frequent 
sanitising routines in polling stations. Additional measures may be needed in 
polling areas where contagion is more prevalent. Testing poll workers for COVID-19 
ahead of elections would be crucial not only for their own health but to prevent 
spreading infections to voters and other election workers. 
5 American poll workers are disproportionately female, something also found in the UK where over three-fifths of poll workers are women. 
There can be issues of descriptive representation, with overwhelmingly white poll workers being noted in the racially diverse USA for ex-
ample (Burden and Milyo 2015, King and Barnes, 2019). Also: Early Voting Information Center, Reed College, https://twitter.com/early_vote/
status/1280291250898268160/photo/1 [accessed 17/7/2020].
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Social distancing and extra health 
precautions will demand more time for  
voting and from poll workers
Given the extra health precautions and distancing needed at the polls, voting will 
take longer. It is important to provide adequate time to citizens and poll workers so 
that the election can be conducted safely. Extended polling station hours, further 
early voting provision and increased levels of postal voting may all need to be 
considered and implemented. Voter accessibility might be enhanced in the longer 
term if additional polling stations are introduced to help with social distancing, as 
in Singapore, or extended early voting is established as a permanent feature.
Different modes of working – such as shifts, staff rotation of tasks etc. – might all 
be considered while also taking into account the different waves of the pandemic 
and severity of lockdowns. Such measures will require considerable investment. It 
may be necessary to increase the number of polling places in order to reducing 
mixing between people from geographic areas with different levels of infection. It is 
extremely important to underline that social distancing and public health measures 
will also be necessary at counts, thereby potentially extending the wait for verified 
results. 
  
Poll workers continue to face electoral 
violence risks
In addition to the COVID-19 health risks, poll workers face other important threats. 
As discussed in section VI below, elections held during the pandemic also face risks 
of electoral malpractice, including electoral violence in some regions. In Mexico, for 
instance, drug-related violence and electoral violence in past elections has shown to 
depress the likelihood of working on election day (Cantú and Ley 2017). Even lower-
level aggression in advanced democracies has been evident, for instance in the UK 
over recent referendums (James and Clark 2019; 2020). It is possible that, were face 
masks deemed mandatory, poll workers would have to police and deal with protests 
from those who object.
Thus, in addition to mitigating the health risks to poll workers, administrators 
also need to provide sufficient security to reduce the risk of electoral violence and 
guarantee the integrity of all those involved.  
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Poll workers need adequate and new forms 
of training to cope with the old and new 
challenges of holding elections 
Outside the UK and the USA, little is known about poll worker training. American 
poll workers get on average 3.5 hours training, for instance, but can still be mistaken 
about electoral law (Burden and Milyo 2015). In the UK, although most poll workers 
are satisfied with the briefing from their local election services team, between 15-
19% still feel electoral law too complex to understand quickly and easily (Clark 
and James 2017). The continuing uncertainty around pandemic guidance and 
requirements will undoubtedly amplify poll worker difficulties several fold.
Thus, training will need to provide poll workers with adequate information on both 
electoral law and public health regulations. It will have to consider different training 
in different areas within countries depending on the local severity of the COVID-19 
infections and lockdowns. Training requires investment and assessment as to its 
effectiveness, both in electoral law and public health measures and compliance.
Despite the challenges, we conclude that the pandemic also provides opportunities 
to improve elections on the ground, with some suggestions above related to the five 
challenges that administrators will face in recruiting, training, procuring for the 
health and safety of workers.
Recommendation: 
Our central recommendation for managing and safeguarding poll workers is 
to plan well ahead and bear in mind that the fast-evolving pandemic may well 
require tailoring measures to local needs and at short notice, depending on the 
severity of lockdowns and COVID-19 infections. 
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Part 3: Administrative 
Collaborations 
Potential benefits and drawbacks of collaboration  
between Election Management Bodies and  
National Task Forces
The relationship between EMBs and national task forces put in place to respond 
to the COVID-19 crisis is of particular importance to the success of elections held 
during the pandemic.6 This coordination is crucial not only for collaboration in the 
planning and timely implementation of safe procedures but also for effective com-
munication with citizens to improve perceptions of safety and to promote political 
participation. This inter-institutional relationship (or lack thereof) can also pose 
obstacles to electoral administration, however, from political dependence and lack 
of decisional autonomy to an erosion of public trust in elections.
Drawing on the work of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems with 
EMBs around the world, we present in this section a series of initial considerations 
regarding the potential impact of national COVID-19 task forces on EMB’s work, 
focusing on potential benefits and challenges that might result from inter-institu-
tional cooperation. 
Different COVID-19 task force models and 
their relationship to EMBs 
Given the pervasiveness of the effects of COVID-19, several countries have 
established response teams or task forces at the national level involving a wide 
range of stakeholders, from government officials to public health professionals 
and representatives of the private sector. Depending on the level of authority and 
mandate of these national task forces, electoral officials that plan and administer 
elections amid the public health crisis are likely to see their work affected by them, 
either directly or indirectly. In some cases, EMBs may be an integral part of the task 
force and have a voice in its decision-making process, while in others, they may only 
passively receive guidance from above. Although the number of examples available 
for analysis is still low, some patterns are starting to emerge from the different 
inter-institutional working arrangements established in countries that have held 
elections recently or that are preparing for upcoming elections
6 We will here primarily focus on how various COVID-19 task force models can impact an election commission’s abilities to organise credi-
ble elections that are safe to voters and election officials.
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Potential benefits to EMBs  
 
An EMB’s direct participation in, or close coordination with, a country’s COVID-19 
task force can generate several operational benefits, potentially contributing to the 
administration of elections during the pandemic. In addition to directly facilitating 
the organisation of electoral events, a constructive engagement with the task force 
can also reinforce the election authority’s credibility by showcasing its ability to 
coordinate with other institutions and to deliver safe and credible elections under 
challenging conditions.  
Improved COVID-19 planning capacity 
EMBs are the leading national entities in terms of planning elections, employing a 
large number of election administration experts. During the COVID-19 pandemic, 
however, these election experts face the challenge of planning and implementing 
electoral activities in a context that imposes serious public health risks. They 
have to incorporate new considerations and additional tasks into an already 
heavy workload that includes organising voter registration drives, training tens or 
thousands of temporary electoral workers, and packing and distributing electoral 
material for delivery to polling stations. With close collaboration between the EMBs 
and task forces and effective utilisation of relevant public health expertise from 
other institutions, EMB staff are less likely to be overwhelmed with new tasks and 
the selection and implementation of preventive measures is more likely to succeed. 
Competent public health professionals can couple their expertise with the technical 
knowledge of electoral authorities to develop a solid COVID-19 risk assessment and 
risk-mitigation plan. This joint work should lead to adjustments to procedures, the 
development of safety protocols, the selection of appropriate personal protective 
equipment (PPE) and other supplies, and the identification of necessary human 
resources such as ad-hoc personnel.
Timely access to sufficient and appropriate PPE  
Senior officials representing a country’s public health sector and its procurement 
agency are often members of the national task force. By utilising their expertise and 
existing procurement mechanisms, election officials can swiftly identify the types, 
specifications, and quantity of PPE needed, as well as hand sanitisers and other 
cleaning materials required to move forward with elections. The EMB can also take 
advantage of its collaboration with the task force to explore alternative avenues for 
timely and cost-effective procurement of COVID-19 material. It can combine its 
procurement needs with those of the country’s public health sector, or gain access 
to existing supplies or the ministry of health’s long-term agreements with suppliers. 
At a minimum, health authorities can share information about reputable national 
and international suppliers and PPE specification requirements, saving the EMB 
time, if not costs. 
Effective public information campaign  
Integrating public health messages into election information campaigns requires 
both a solid grasp of the COVID-19 and how it spreads and an understanding of 
how to effectively communicate epidemiological concepts and terminology to 
various segments of the electorate. National task forces can initiate collaborations 
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between the EMB’s public information teams and the ministry of health, even if 
these officials themselves are not members of the task force. This new avenue could 
facilitate the development of more appropriate messaging and effective designs, 
or open up new channels of communications used by the ministry of health but 
unknown or inaccessible to the EMB prior to the crisis.          
Public perception of EMB improved 
In general, an EMB’s credibility as a responsible and professional institution could 
be enhanced should the election authority be a visible member of a COVID-19 
task force that is widely perceived as successful in implementing its mandate. As 
mentioned above, if the EMB’s planning and operational delivery of a COVID-19 
mitigation plan benefits from its membership in the task force, the EMB’s standing 
as a credible election body could be further strengthened as well.
Potential challenges and risks to EMBs 
Although coordination and collaboration between EMBs and national task forces 
can facilitate processes and improve the overall conduct of elections during the 
COVID-19 public health crisis, this relationship can in some instances also pose 
significant risks to the EMB. 
Communication and decision-making bottlenecks 
Successful collaboration between public institutions requires effective 
communication and a clear delineation of tasks and decision-making 
responsibilities. Because COVID-19 task forces are, by nature, ad-hoc institutions, 
the rules and logic of their engagement with EMBs and any division of labour 
might not be obvious. If clear channels of communication are not established early 
in the process, institutions might misunderstand each other’s tasks and end up 
not completing tasks that they thought were the other institution’s responsibility. 
Alternatively, both institutions may believe a specific task is their responsibility and 
duplicate work, which might lead to contradictory measures or directives, creating 
confusion among citizens. To avoid these issues, EMBs and national task forces can 
make arrangements such as, for example, 1) the national task force issues general 
guidance for the prevention and mitigation of COVID-19 transmission and the EMB 
becomes responsible for applying such guidance to the specific context of elections; 
or 2) the national task force works in consultation with the EMB and its electoral 
experts to understand the electoral process and issue guidance specifically for 
electoral activities. 
Operational delays caused by the inclusion of additional actors 
Even if the responsibilities are well-delineated and communicated, the inclusion 
of new actors at different stages of electoral planning might still pose time-
management problems. As more people must be consulted or review measures 
and procedures before approval, some decisions might take longer, delaying tasks 
related to operational implementation. As electoral calendars are usually tight, 
these delays can cause significant disruptions to election activities. 
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Perception of political dependence and reputational issues 
As national task forces are usually led by or at least involve prominent government 
figures, close collaboration with them during the crisis might be seen by some as 
a violation of the political independence and autonomy of the EMB. In contexts 
where COVID-19 has been politicised and political groups have different perceptions 
of the threat posed by the disease, any measures taken in coordination with 
governmental task forces might be perceived as benefitting the government. In 
some circumstances, these perceptions might be accurate, and the EMB might 
indeed be subject to political interference, especially when incumbents abuse states 
of emergency to advance their political interests. It is also possible that, where 
the coronavirus is being used for different narratives by different political groups, 
any decisions made by the EMB on preventive measures will be seen as partisan, 
whether or not they align with the government’s guidelines. 
Whether political interference in elections is real or assumed, it damages the image 
of the EMB and might erode trust in the electoral process and results altogether. 
Finally, the reputation of the EMB – and potentially trust in the safety of elections 
– can also be damaged if there is a known collaboration between the EMB and the 
national task force but the performance of the national task force is seen by the 
public as weak. In this case, negative views of the task force could also affect public 
perception of the EMB’s performance.  
Inter-institutional coordination and collaboration are well-known challenges in 
both developing and developed countries. These challenges become even more 
accentuated when one of the institutions is a new temporary body, with a mandate 
that is not yet clear, and which needs to work and make decisions quickly to 
address major threats to citizens. In this sense, COVID-19 task forces, irrespective 
of format, face significant challenges. EMBs, which already work under tight time 
and financial constraints, also have new important obstacles to overcome during the 
public health crisis.  
As discussed in this section, collaboration between these two institutions, if done 
properly and in a favourable political environment, can be extremely beneficial 
to both. Combining EMBs’ expertise and experience of electoral processes with 
the public health knowledge of other members of the task force; the human, 
financial, and material resources provided to the work group; and the authority to 
make speedy decisions, is likely the best recipe for safe, successful elections. As 
also mentioned, however, several factors can undermine the effectiveness of this 
collaboration, and even leave the EMB’s image – and, by consequence, public trust 
in elections – more damaged than it would have been if the work of the EMB and the 
national task force had not been linked.  
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Recommendations:  
• EMBs and national task forces formed to deal with the COVID-19 crisis should 
ensure that each institution’s tasks and responsibilities related to issuing 
guidance, planning, and implementing preventive measures for elections are 
clear and well-delineated.
• Regardless of its level of involvement with the national task force, EMBs 
should strive to obtain advisory, logistical, and operational support from 
other groups while maintaining political neutrality and communicating 
transparently to citizens.
• As it is ultimately their responsibility to hold elections safely, EMBs must 
coordinate with competent public health authorities to inform decisions 
regarding dates of elections and preventive measures to be taken, working 
to build political consensus around these decisions and taking a firm stand 
against actors who push for decisions that can put voters and poll workers at 
risk to advance their political interests.  
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Part 4: Election  
observation 
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, almost all national elections 
were observed by independent election observers. In countries 
where election outcomes have historically been controversial, 
these efforts typically involve an international and domestic 
component. Internationally, groups such as the European Union, 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the 
Organisation of American States and the Carter Centre were 
present at over 70 per cent of elections held between 2006 and 
2012. Domestically, civil society groups including religious bodies 
and trade unions groups typically come together to create a 
domestic monitoring organisation. Such efforts are in addition to 
the presence of party agents working for the main political parties 
and candidates, and in some cases the systematic positioning of 
journalists by major media houses. The questions facing observers 
during the COVID-19 pandemic is whether these approaches are 
still feasible.
Traditional methods of election observation are heavily 
dependent on spending considerable ‘time on the ground’, with 
the deployment of long-term observers, numerous meetings in the 
capital city, and the posting of pairs of observers to sample polling 
stations. Given these practices, the kind of social distancing 
requirements introduced by many governments to halt the 
spread of COVID-19 present significant challenges for election 
observation.
Most obviously, if airports are closed and long quarantine periods 
are put in place, international observers will not be able to 
attend elections at all. The movements of significant numbers 
of individuals across national borders and within countries also 
poses an obvious health risk to both the observers and the people 
that they meet. Less obviously, much of the data that informs 
observation missions – from newspaper coverage through to the 
tracking of incidents of political violence – may not be collected 
if organisations and individuals are prevented from doing their work. There is also 
a significant risk that political leaders will seek to manipulate the pandemic to 
undermine observation efforts, especially in countries in which democracy has not 
been consolidated. This is what happened in Burundi, where a late requirement 
that international observers should observe two weeks quarantine meant that they 
did not travel. Their absence significantly aided the ruling party’s attempt to pass a 
problematic process off as a high quality and credible election.
In some cases, it may be hard to tell whether these kinds of barriers are the results 
of administrative shortcomings or represent a deliberate attempt to evade scrutiny. 
Indeed, even where electoral commissions are committed to democratic norms 
and values, the adoption of the kinds of innovations detailed elsewhere in this 
International Election Observers
The Declaration of Principles for International 
Election Observation and the Code of 
Conduct For International Election Observers 
set out the norms that have been established 
for credible observation. They are now 
endorsed by 55 organisations including the 
following.
Intergovernmental organisations:
• The African Union
• The Commonwealth Secretariat
• The European Union
• Economic Community of West African 
States
• The Organization of American States
• The Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe
• Pacific Islands Forum
International nongovernmental 
organisations: 
• The Carter Center
• The National Democratic Institute
• International Republican Institute
• Westminster Foundation for Democracy
The principle actors who drafted the 
Declaration meet regularly to consider how 
it is being applied and to consider how to 
respond to new challenges.
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report are likely to generate fresh challenges for observers. 
Postal and electronic voting, for example, can allow citizens 
to socially distance while casting their ballot, but may create 
opaque systems that require different strategies to ensure 
effective oversight. These challenges are considerable, but they 
are not insurmountable, and the fresh thinking they require may 
strengthen election observation in the long run. 
International observers have at times been criticised – sometimes 
unfairly – for failing to detect or call out electoral manipulation. 
In particular, the fact that observers did not condemn elections 
in Kenya (2017) and Malawi (2019) that were subsequently found 
to be flawed by domestic courts resulted in complaints from 
opposition leaders and civil society groups. This suggests the 
need to further strengthen the approaches that international 
observers utilise – or at the very least to address the way that 
they are perceived. The need to radically rethink traditional 
models in order to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic creates 
an opportunity for the observation sector to build back better. In 
particular, international observers are likely to find that they need 
to work more collaboratively with domestic observers, and that 
they need to find new ways to source data during COVID-19. Doing 
so will not only ensure that elections continue to be effectively 
monitored, but can also lay the foundations for the evolution of 
more balanced and innovative approaches to observation.
The options facing international  
      observers
There are four main strategies that international observers can 
use to respond to the pandemic. They can choose not to observe; 
to operate as usual in cases where COVID-19  has been largely 
contained; to recruit expatriates based in the country; and to 
operate virtually, using new methods to crowdsource data, or 
remotely, through new partnerships with domestic groups, which 
act as their ‘eyes and ears’. Each of these approaches has strengths 
and weaknesses that are set out in detail below.
Although some of these options may appear to represent a 
significant break from existing practice, versions of all of them 
have already been deployed in non-COVID-19 contexts. Observers 
have been prevented from attending elections, or certain parts of 
a country, when security risks are severe, as has at times been the 
case in Afghanistan. European Union missions in some African 
countries, and the smaller teams that are sometimes deployed 
by the embassies of specific countries, have at times employed 
a limited number of expats to assist their work. Indeed, even 
the more radical option of observing virtually or remotely is not 
completely new – a Carter Center mission to the 2018 elections in 
Sierra Leone combined a four-person expert group with a strong 
partnership to domestic monitors conducting a parallel vote 
tabulation (PVT), to provide critical information to the larger 
Four options for international 
observers to respond to COVID-19
1. Don’t observe 
Pro: Avoids all health risks. 
Con: Removes electoral scrutiny.
2. Observe traditionally 
Pro: Allows scrutiny & no disruption. 
Con: Maximises health risks & no 
innovation.
3. Observe with expat staff 
Pro: Limits disruption & health  
risks, cost effective. 
Con: Loss of expertise & profile.
4. Observe virtually and through 
partnership 
Pro: Strengthens domestic voices,  
limited health risks. 
Con: Less operational independence  
& control.
COVID-19 risks and threats to 
observers
Health of observers. Observers may 
catch COVID-19, harming their health and 
complicating logistical plans.
Health of citizens and officials. Observers 
from high COVID-19 areas risk infecting 
those they meet and spreading the disease.
Travel. International restrictions may 
prevent observers flying in. Local restrictions 
may render some parts of the country 
unreachable.
Data. Much of the data that informs 
observation missions might not be possible 
to collect or is harder to access.
New processes. The adoption/expansion of 
measures such as postal voting and digital 
campaigns may require new observation 
methods. 
Political manipulation. Political leaders 
seeking to manipulate elections may 
use COVID-19 to prevent, stymie or 
instrumentalise observation.
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observer groups sponsored by the African Union, Commonwealth, ECOWAS and 
European Union. Responding effectively to COVID-19, therefore, might not require 
the invention of completely new strategies, but rather a more consistent application 
of recent innovations. 
While it is useful to evaluate these options as four separate strategies, they are 
not mutually exclusive. International observers might try to recruit some of 
their team in-country while working more closely with domestic groups and 
utilising new technology. This point is significant because there are good reasons 
to think that observation missions need to move in this direction anyway. When 
it comes to technology, elections are becoming increasingly digitised and the 
organisations responsible for examining adherence to the Declaration of Principles 
for International Election Observation are actively developing guidelines on how 
to observe online campaigning. When it comes to domestic monitors, there has at 
times been a tendency for international missions to coordinate and engage more 
with each other than with their domestic counterparts. Developing new ways to 
oversee technology and work hand-in-hand with domestic monitors would not 
only help international observers to respond more effectively to the pandemic, but 
could also lay down a blueprint for how to develop a more sustainable observation 
industry for the future.
1. Don’t observe
International observers can decide not to send a standard mission team to 
elections and to play no formal role in the process. This was effectively what some 
organisations chose to do for Malawi’s presidential election re-run on 23 June 
2020. Two very significant types of risk were eliminated: first, the health risk to 
international observers and those that they come into contact with; and second, the 
reputational risk of issuing inaccurate statements due to unreliable or incomplete 
data from limited observation. 
However, not observing also exacerbates a different set of risks. Perhaps most 
significantly, it may encourage incumbent governments to adopt more overt and 
damaging rigging strategies. In the May 2020 elections in Burundi, for example, 
there was no significant attempt by ruling party leaders to rein in the intimidation 
of opposition supporters and candidates. The absence of documented evidence by 
international observers reduces the willingness of the international community to 
speak out in cases of election rigging – especially if there is not a credible domestic 
group that can supply this information. At the same time, the absence of observers 
may also undermine public confidence in controversial elections that were actually 
legitimate. 
Given the way in which authoritarian leaders have manipulated the pandemic to 
consolidate their own authority, it would be a dangerous development for global 
democracy if international observers were to completely vacate the electoral stage. 
2. Observe ‘traditionally’
Where elections are held in countries in which COVID-19 has been brought under 
control, international observers may be tempted to observe as they have in the past. 
This would minimise disruption and enable observers to collect their own data, 
reducing concerns about the reliability of information. Yet continuing to operate 
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as normal would generate a number of risks and may also represent a missed 
opportunity. For one thing, continuing to rely on traditional models means that 
observers may ultimately find that they are unable to monitor elections in countries 
where the number of cases remains very high, such as the United States. Even when 
observers can deploy personnel, the need to respect quarantine regulations will 
significantly increase the costs and logistical challenges of international missions. 
The severe health risks generated by international team members from countries 
with high numbers of cases such as the United Kingdom and United States 
travelling to countries with relatively low numbers of cases – such as many African 
countries – would raise serious ethical questions and require the imposition of strict 
new health protocols.
Leaving aside health and logistics, traditional methods of observation are also 
likely to be significantly less effective in the current environment. In countries 
such as South Korea and Uganda, campaign rallies and public meetings have been 
replaced by digital campaigns. In some cases, this has come about through the 
voluntary compliance of parties and candidates, while in others, such as Uganda, 
it has been mandated by the government or electoral commission. As a result, an 
increasing proportion of electoral activity – including campaign spending, voter 
mobilisation, hate speech and so on – will take place online and will not requires 
observers who are deployed on the ground to be monitored. At the same time, 
the pandemic is likely to spur the growing use of digital technology for processes 
such as voter registration, identification, and in some cases even voting itself. This 
will increasingly shift the focus of electoral manipulation – and efforts to prevent 
it – away from manual processes towards digital ones. One of the greatest risks for 
international election observation is to stand still while the world changes.
3. Observe with expat staff
When traditional ways of working are unavailable or undesirable, international 
observers have another option: recruiting expatriates – foreign nationals resident in 
the country – who are already on the ground. Again, there are both advantages and 
disadvantages to this option, and the balance between them will vary depending 
on the context. One advantage is that this model is likely to be much cheaper and 
greener, given that expensive and carbon-intensive international flights would 
not be required. International observers would also gain access to a larger pool of 
people some of whom may have valuable language skills – a significant asset in 
many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, for example, where the official language typically 
masks a high degree of linguistic diversity. Expats who have lived in a country for 
a long period of time may also have a deeper and more nuanced understanding of 
local political dynamics and be less put off by the prospect of spending an extended 
period of time in-country. Thus, international observers could leverage this shift in 
their operating model as an opportunity to increase the geographical and temporal 
breadth of observation, as well as its sensitivity to local context.
However, there are also real disadvantages to adopting this approach. The most 
significant of these relates to impartiality, both real and perceived. The UN 
Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation 2005, states that: 
‘No one should be allowed to be a member of an international election observer 
mission unless that person is free from any political, economic or other conflicts 
of interest’ (United Nations 2005, Paragraph 6). Impartiality is critical, not least 
because the perception that international observers are less partisan than domestic 
monitors lends their verdicts greater impact on citizens’ assessments of electoral 
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integrity (Bush and Prather 2018). Their impartiality may be called into question 
by employing expatriates who have become embedded in local political debates – 
even if they have no direct connection to a specific political party – and so may not 
be seen to be genuinely impartial. This risk will be heightened during elections in 
which the rights of foreign nationals are a live campaign issue. Moreover, in some 
cases – for example some Commonwealth countries – expats may also enjoy the 
right to vote, which would render them ineligible according to the rules employed 
by most international observation groups. 
Another disadvantage associated with the recruitment of individuals already on the 
ground concerns protecting staff from harassment and reprisals during and after 
an election. Some recent elections have been characterised by significant violence 
against domestic election observers. In Mozambique, for example, Anastacio 
Matavel, a prominent domestic observer, was murdered in the lead-up to the 2019 
election (BBC 2019). International observers currently enjoy the privileged position 
of being able to leave a contested electoral environment, but this would not be 
true for expatriates. More broadly, recruiting expats and then continuing with a 
traditional model of observation would suffer from all of the limitations identified 
in Option 2. International observers therefore stand to gain from adopting some of 
the more innovative options available if they move to observe virtually and through 
partnership.  
4. Observe ‘virtually’ and through partnership
A more radical alternative for international observers is to reduce the significance 
that they place on deploying their own staff on the ground and to instead 
observe ‘virtually’ and through partnerships with domestic organisations. While 
international donors already fund the efforts of domestic civil society groups, and 
international observers do engage with their domestic counterparts, this rarely 
takes the form of a true partnership. In addition, some international missions are 
reluctant to rely on data collected by domestic groups due to a perception that they 
are not objective. Partly as a result, domestic monitors have in some cases arrived at 
significantly different – and often more critical – findings than their international 
counterparts. Such discrepancies are problematic given that international observers 
tend to dominate media headlines, while divergence between the statements of 
observers can be strategically exploited by authoritarian leaders (Arceneaux and 
Leithner 2017).
A more integrated strategy could have three different elements, which might be 
deployed as a package or in different combinations, and some of which can clearly 
be combined with more traditional methods of election observation.
• Partnership. Working with domestic monitors and civil society groups, helping 
to fund their activities and then sharing the data collected, would reduce the 
need to have large numbers of international observers. Such partnerships could 
be established either by forming bilateral partnerships with individual groups, 
or by supporting election ‘situation rooms’ in which a number of different 
7 For more information see https://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/commonwealth-secretariat-supports-peace-and-dialogue-mala-
wi-upcoming-polls
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groups pool resources and data. Given that domestic groups typically deploy 
many more individuals to many more polling stations, working in this way 
would enhance the geographical coverage of international missions as well as 
strengthen the resource base of domestic groups.
• Virtual monitoring. With an increasing proportion of electoral activity taking 
place digitally and online – especially during the pandemic – it makes sense 
for international observers to place greater emphasis on monitoring online 
spaces such as Twitter and Facebook. Given that most newspapers are available 
digitally, or can be quickly scanned, traditional media can also be monitored 
remotely.
• Crowdsourcing. Crowdsourcing (and then verifying) data from individuals 
on the ground – as the Ushahidi platform famously did to track the violence 
surrounding Kenya’s 2007-8 general elections – can be a cost-effective way 
of mapping the extent of electoral manipulation. Along with working in 
partnership with local groups with existing networks and virtual monitoring, 
crowd sourcing data can also insulate observers from the risk of being shut out 
of certain areas due to local lockdowns – so long as access to the Internet is 
maintained throughout the electrical cycle.
While this full package of strategies has not yet been employed in any one election, 
for Malawi’s 2020 presidential re-run the Commonwealth Secretariat utilised both 
partnership and virtual monitoring. More specifically, they partnered with the 
National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) and local civil society organisations 
such as the Public Affairs Committee (PAC) and the 50-50 Campaign to support 
local citizen observation and an election situation room. Through these domestic 
organisations, the Commonwealth was able to gain access to the data collected by 
over 6,000 observers and volunteers across the country, who provided real time 
reports on pre-election, election day and post-election day developments via a 
specially created WhatsApp group.7 In this way, the Commonwealth effectively 
accessed valuable information on a scale that would have been impossible for a 
‘traditional’ mission, while strengthening domestic processes. 
Of course, no one approach is a silver bullet, and there are clearly risks associated 
with this strategy. Local partners may be perceived to be partisan, and so 
collaborating with them may compromise the efforts of international missions 
to demonstrate their independence and neutrality. It may also be challenging for 
international missions to maintain quality control if they are physically absent 
from a country or are only operating a skeleton team. This may raise concerns about 
the quality of information that is collected, which in turn may undermine public 
confidence in international observers and their findings. This would be a significant 
cost, as international observers have worked very hard over the past decade to 
adopt increasingly rigorous and systematic methods in order to insulate themselves 
against accusations that they cherry pick evidence.
Adopting a more collaborative strategy may also generate fresh coordination 
challenges such as unnecessary duplication of work, especially if different 
international observation missions do not communicate effectively and separately 
contact the same domestic organisations. It is also true that domestic organisations 
usually lack the kind of access that is afforded to international observers, who 
find it easier to arrange meetings at short notice with high level political leaders 
and electoral officials, and to gain access to important electoral spaces and data. 
However, these issues are manageable. Identifying domestic groups known to be 
more neutral are professional, enhancing their capacity and agreeing protocols 
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for data collection ahead of time can help to ensure that the information that is 
collected is accurate and reliable. Posting a small number of international staff 
to help oversee the observation process can also help to strengthen personal 
relationships, build trust and facilitate access for domestic groups. The up-front 
costs of shifting to this approach will probably be higher than some of the other 
options, but the long-term benefits of this approach are likely to considerably 
outweigh the investment. 
Observing the future
Maintaining an effective and credible system of election observation requires 
international missions to adapt and innovate. In addition to seeing the COVID-19 
pandemic as a global crisis and a major challenge, international observers should 
therefore also see the current situation as an opportunity. Of course, there is no need 
to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Once the threat of the COVID 19 pandemic 
recedes, there are good reasons for international observers to go back to deploying 
international staff. Senior international figures can help to share expertise, 
coordinate among the international community, and increase the space available 
for domestic groups to operate. But future deployments may look very different. 
The ever more sophisticated way in which elections are being manipulated 
means that observing a small number of selected polling stations is likely to be 
increasingly ineffective. Moreover, the fact that international observers only cover 
a tiny proportion of polling stations, most of which are already covered by domestic 
groups, suggests that these resources could be better invested elsewhere.
A more efficient and effective approach could be to develop a virtual and 
partnership-based model of observation during the pandemic, using this 
as the foundation for a new model of observation that would see a greater 
complementarity and specialisation of roles. Domestic groups, with their vast 
numbers and existing presence on the ground, have clear advantages when it comes 
to data collection at the polling station level. International groups can utilise their 
access to comparative expertise to strengthen the capacity of domestic groups and 
develop new ways to effectively observe digital processes. Working collaboratively 
and sharing data will enable both sets of organisations to come to more accurate 
and reliable conclusions. Importantly, such an approach would enable international 
observers to use their access to the global media and the international community 
to amplify the voice of domestic monitors and ensure that their recommendations 
are prioritised. 
Some groups are already implementing aspects of this approach, and demonstrating 
its benefits. Most notably, non-governmental observation bodies such as the trio 
of American organisations – the Carter Center, the National Democratic Institute 
and the International Republican Institute – have worked closely with domestic 
observers for some time. These partnerships have, in some cases, included working 
through the network of domestic observers, providing funding, and collaboratively 
implementing a PVT to assess the credibility of the official results. However, these 
efforts have not always involved paying close attention to election technology and 
social media, or culminated in smaller and less high-profile international missions. 
Further extending and institutionalising these kinds of approaches will better 
enable observers to respond to growing concerns about global knowledge and power 
inequalities and to the need to ensure that Western institutions do not crowd out the 
voices of the very citizens that they are working to empower.




• The travel restrictions and health and safety protocols associated with 
COVID-19 threaten to make traditional forms of international election 
observation impossible. International observers should carefully weigh up the 
strengths and weaknesses of the four main strategies open to them.
• The response of international observers will be most effective if they approach 
this as an opportunity to strengthen their work for the long term, rather than 
simply introducing COVID-19 sensitive guidelines and protocols to respond 
to the current health crisis. Many of the changes that are likely to be required 
during the pandemic were already highly advisable.
• International observers should prioritise innovation, look for new ways to 
harness technology and build stronger partnerships between domestic and 
international groups. This will allow the industry both to respond effectively 
to new challenges and to build back better. 
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Part 5: Elections and the 
risk of violence 
The COVID-19 pandemic and the unprecedented social, economic and political 
crises have been accompanied in many parts of the world with dramatic increases 
in riots, protests and other forms of violence (Gutiérrez-Romero, 2020). In countries 
where there has been a history of violent elections, considering strategies for 
mitigating possible heightened risks will be relevant when elections are being 
planned.  
Drawing on the experience of 10 countries that held national elections between 
March and June 2020, we present evidence on the link between lockdowns and 
electoral conflict. We then draw lessons from these elections and provide insights 
into old and new forms of coercion, intimidation, electoral fraud and other forms 
of malpractice that might emerge in some contexts. Our main findings are that in 
some cases pre-election lockdowns have been characterised by political repression, 
and that elections held during the pandemic have involved, on average, high levels 
of protests, riots and violence against civilians. In short: elections convened under 
pandemic conditions may be at heightened risk of conflict, especially if elections 
have been violent in the past.  
Evidence 
We list in Table 1 the ten countries analysed here, including the dates when 
lockdowns began and elections were held. For instance, Guinea held parliamentary 
elections on 22 March, just before announcing its lockdown, and after postponing 
the election four times from the original date of January 2019. Most other countries 
have held elections after their lockdowns. An interesting case is Mali that held 
elections on 29 March amid the imminent threat of the pandemic and armed 
conflict after postponing the election three times since November 2018.   
To gain leverage on the question of whether lockdowns and recent elections may 
have triggered conflict, we use the Armed Conflict Location and Events Data 
(ACLED). ACLED provides real-time data on political violence around the globe 
based on media and government reports, humanitarian agencies, and research 
publications (Raleigh et al. 2010). 
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Table 1. Dates of COVID-19 lockdowns and elections 
  
Country Date Covid-19 
lockdown
Date election  
2020
Date of previous 
election
Total ACLED  
events* 1 Jan 2013 
to 4 Jul 2020
Benin 03 Mar 20 17 May 20 13 Apr 16 188
Burundi 12 Mar 20 02 May 20 28 Sep 13 5,674
Guinea 26 Mar 20 22 Mar 20 28 Jun 15 993
Israel 15 Mar 20 02 Mar 20 15 De 13 1,795
Malawi 16 Mar 20 23 Jun 20 21 Jul 15 437
Mali 11 Mar 20 29 Mar 20 25 May 15 2,990
Mongolia 16 Mar 20 24 Jun 20 17 Sep 19 128
Serbia 15 Mar 20 21 Jun 20 02 Apr 17 1,534
South Korea 27 Feb 20 15 Apr 20 21 Jun 19 4,713
Suriname 14 Mar 20 25 May 20 29 Jun 16 32
*Includes battles, protests, riots, violence against civilians, explosions/remote violence, strategic 
developments. 
Sources: Author estimates using ACAPS (2020), ACLED (2020) and Hale et al. (2020). 
Figure 1 shows the extent to which lockdowns and recent elections are associated 
with changes in the probability of various types of conflict. In this figure, Panel 
B displays the probability of the state being directly involved as an actor in these 
conflicts, in its capacity of military, police, guards or government. 
This evidence suggests that post-lockdown periods have in these cases been 
associated with statistically significant reductions in protest and important 
increases in violence against civilians. During post-electoral periods, by contrast, 
there have been significant increases in protests and slight reductions in violence 
against civilians. While these associations are based on a non-representative sample 
of ten cases only and they do not prove causal impacts, they are suggestive of 
possible causal effects. Further details of the regression analyses underlying this 
figure are provided in the Appendix. 
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Source: Author estimates using ACLED events between 1 January 2013 and 4 July 2020 using panel fixed 
effects regression for Benin, Burundi, Guinea, Israel, Mali, Malawi, Mongolia, Serbia, South Korea and Suriname 
that have held elections in 2020. Horizontal bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
In Figure 2, we track the various types of conflict on a daily basis for the ten 
countries analysed from 1 January 2013 to 4 July 2020. We depict the most recent 
election day by a vertical line. It is clear that there were very high levels of protest 
both immediately before and immediately after these elections. It is also clear that 
violence against civilians started to increase during the pre-electoral period and was 
high around election day but declined slightly during the post-electoral period. In 
Figure 2, all panels on the right depict the fatalities associated with these conflicts. 
Despite the low incidence, it is still alarming that the number of fatalities related 
to battles and riots have increased after elections. In some cases, of course, these 
changes may not be related to the pandemic, but elections held under pandemic 
conditions do appear to be linked to changing patterns in the use of force. 
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Figure 2. Violent events before and after 2020 elections in Benin, Burundi, 
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These analyses suggest several possible 
lessons for practitioners: 
• The evidence indicates that governments may be using pre-election lockdowns 
to silence the opposition by dampening the activities through which voters 
protest against coercion and by increasing violence against civilians. In short, 
pre-election lockdowns appear to be characterised by repression, and also by the 
dampening of contestation.  This suggests the need for electoral observers and 
electoral assistance providers to be attentive to the possibility that unusually 
quiet election campaigns signal repression, and to work with governments to 
guarantee that rights to freedom of association and freedom of expression are 
observed as far as is possible under pandemic conditions.
• Elections, not lockdowns, are associated with increases in protest in these ten 
cases. Although lockdowns elsewhere have been times of increased protest, the 
cases included here are, on average, characterised by depressed protest activity 
during pre-electoral lockdowns but increased protest immediately before and 
after election day. This suggests the need for careful election planning to avoid 
unnecessary unrest. 
• Protests following disputed elections have the potential to increase COVID-19 
infections, which may then and lead to further violence. We know from previous 
research that protests often follow elections characterised by misconduct and 
manipulation (Beaulieu 2014; Birch 2020; Daxecker 2012; Gutiérrez-Romero 
2014). Thus poorly-run elections may trigger a vicious cycle for incumbent 
governments, generating violence which worsens the pandemic and leads to 
further violence. This reinforces the need for practitioners to ensure careful 
electoral security planning in conjunction with pandemic-specific measures. 
Though we do not yet have sufficient data to explore all the relevant aspects of 
electoral violence during the pandemic, we can also speculate on the basis of our 
current knowledge that several other dangers might also arise: 
• COVID-19 anti-poverty packages could be abused for vote-buying by incumbent 
parties, who may strategically deliver these funds to government supporters and 
delay distribution to groups associated with the opposition. This phenomenon 
could increase the risk of violent reactions from aggrieved groups. 
• Social distancing and the excessive use of force could silence media outlets’ 
coverage of different aspects of elections, including electoral violence. 
• Localised lockdowns could be used to dampen turnout in opposition areas, as it 
occurred during the most recent Ebola crisis (The Lancet, 2019). 
• Increased sanitary measures at the polls will in many cases require extending 
the period of voting for more than one day, as South Africa is considering doing 
and as happened in the 15 April Korean election, the Queensland election 
of 29 March and various US primary elections, where early voting has been 
encouraged (IFES 2020). Extra time allowed for voting might give opportunities 
for ballot stuffing, which could prompt post-electoral protests. 
• Some countries could enforce strict lockdowns shortly after elections to silence 
the opposition and potential protests. That is, post-election lockdowns could 
potentially emerge as a repression tactic. 
How to hold elections safely and democratically during the COVID-19 pandemic
32
• COVID-19 has unleashed significant hate speech and incitement to violence 
against minorities, migrants, and other groups historically discriminated 
against around the world. Violence against women has also increased during 
the pandemic. These trends are likely to be exacerbated during elections leaving 
large groups vulnerable to electoral violence. 
 
According to the evidence considered here, elections held during the pandemic 
appear in some cases to be at heightened risk of violence. We do not know of 
any pandemic-specific intervention that could easily reverse the upward trends 
in conflict suggested by these data. Previous research on electoral violence 
suggests that an independent electoral commission, a competent and impartial 
law enforcement apparatus, a robust civil society and informed public all reduce 
election violence, and these are all the more important under pandemic conditions. 
Recommendation: 
In parts of the world with a history of significant electoral conflict, elections may 
be at increased risk of violence during the pandemic. Practitioners should ensure 
that measures are employed to enhance electoral security in contexts where 
violence is likely before, during and after polling day.
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Conclusion 
The analyses presented in this briefing suggest that like most social and political 
processes, elections held under pandemic conditions present greater challenges 
than those held at other times. Yet the experience of elections carried out over 
the course of the past several months indicates that it is possible to hold safe and 
fair polls in most contexts. Such elections may be more expensive than normal 
(Asplund, James and Clark 2020), but the democratic value of elections will in most 
cases make polling worthwhile, even in difficult economic circumstances. 
Indeed, the challenges of the pandemic may prompt electoral practitioners to 
reconsider and improve their practices in a number of areas, including inclusive 
and accountable electoral administration, the management of poll workers, and 
electoral observation. Electoral practice is an area in which we can realistically 
expect to be able to ‘build back better’ after COVID-19 has been conquered. 
The experience of holding elections during the current COVID-19 pandemic will 
also be valuable in guiding electoral practitioners to develop practices that are 
resilient to future health crises. The changing climate and the steady encroachment 
of human activities on the natural world both work to increase the likelihood of 
epidemics and pandemics, which are in all probability going to become more 
frequent in future years. Electoral administration must adapt not only to the 
immediate threat posed by COVID-19, but also to a world in which any election 
period could coincide with a major outbreak of an infectious disease for which 
treatments are limited.   
Even countries such as the UK, which have chosen to postpone elections, may be 
well advised to take on board the adjustments to electoral procedure that have been 
adopted elsewhere. As we have argued, such adjustments have a number of other 
benefits in making elections better. 
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Appendix 
This appendix contains ancillary data that underlie the figures presented in section 
VI above. Tables A1 and A2 present the regression models underlying the figures 
presented above. Table A3 shows the number of ACLED events in each of the ten 
countries analysed. The regression analyses show that:
• On average, the probability of experiencing violence against civilians after 
lockdowns has increased by 5%. The regression discontinuity graph shows this 
is bad news, as it reverses the downward trajectory of this kind of violence. 
Moreover, this small and rapid increase in violence against civilians, if it 
continues to further increase, could lead to the peak levels experienced years 
ago.
• On average, the probability of protests occurring after elections has increased by 
nearly 7%. The regression discontinuity graph suggests that right before these 
elections the incidence of protests was already quite high, the highest over the 
last seven years. Thus, an extra 7% on average is a substantial increase. 
• The association between recent elections and battles although small at 2%, 
should by no means be underestimated. This small increase has reversed the 
downward trend in battles that these nine countries had experienced since 2013. 
• Previous violent elections increase the likelihood that the state will experience 
protests and riots. These coefficients are quite substantial, with an increase 
probability of nearly 6% and 9% respectively. 
Table A1. ACLED events between 1 January 2013 and 4 July 2020,  
panel fixed effects 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  





































Observations 19,239 19,239 19,239 19,239
Number of countries 10 10 10 10
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Observations 4,057 4,057 4,057 4,057
Number of countries 10 10 10 10
Total Benin Burundi Guinea Israel Malawi Mali Mongolia Serbia South 
Korea
Suriname
Panel A: 1 January 2013 – 4 July 2020
Battles 1,647 26 437 54 39 3 1,086 N/A 1 1 N/A
Explosions/Remote violence 1,628 N/A 402 11 638 N/A 559 N/A 27 N/A N/A
Protests 8,381 83 573 426 668 194 289 108 1,428 4,595 17
Riots 1,767 48 471 513 195 254 142 4 29 103 8
Strategic developments 1,337 12 686 45 187 9 341 16 21 9 1
Violence against civilians 4,479 36 3,190 85 58 35 1,036 N/A 28 5 6
Total 19,239 205 5,760 1,124 1,795 495 3,453 128 1,534 4,713 32
Panel B: 1 January 2020 – Right before 2020 elections
Battles 101 4 15 2 N/A 1 79 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Explosions/Remote violence 84 N/A 4 N/A 45 N/A 35 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Protests 1,232 2 1 158 13 53 33 24 115 823 10
Riots 268 8 18 156 3 48 3 3 3 21 5
Strategic developments 112 3 45 18 17 1 15 7 1 4 1
Violence against civilians 310 6 166 17 1 7 105 N/A 1 5 2
Total 2,107 23 249 351 79 110 270 34 120 853 18
Panel C: Right after 2020 elections
Battles 145 4 6 11 2 N/A 121 N/A N/A 1 N/A
Explosions/Remote violence 41 N/A 2 N/A 5 N/A 34 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Protests 1,168 1 1 35 88 1 27 N/A 111 904 N/A
Riots 133 7 22 51 23 N/A 19 N/A 2 7 2
Strategic developments 69 N/A 26 4 6 N/A 29 N/A 3 1 N/A
Violence against civilians 198 1 69 16 3 N/A 108 N/A 1 N/A N/A
Total 1,754 13 126 117 127 1 338 0 117 913 2
Source: Author estimates using ACLED (2020). 
Table A2. ACLED events where the state (police, military, guard, or 
government) is involved as an actor between 1 January 2013 and 4 July 2020, 
panel fixed effects  
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Source: Author estimates using ACLED (2020). 
 
Table A3. ACLED events in ten countries that have held elections since  
March 2020  
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